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Abstract
I construct a model of religion as an institution that provides community enforcement of
contracts within families. Family altruism implies that family members cannot commit to
reporting broken contracts to the community, so the community must monitor contract per-
formance as well as inflicting punishment. The community has less information than family
members, and so community monitoring is inefficient. I provide evidence from a study of
Amish institutions, including qualitative evidence from sociological accounts and quantita-
tive evidence from a novel dataset covering nearly the entire Amish population of Holmes
county, Ohio. I find that 1) Amish households are not unitary, 2) the Amish community
helps to support families by inflicting punishments on wayward family members, 3) with-
out the community Amish people have difficulty committing to punishing family members,
and 4) Amish community membership strengthens family ties, while otherwise similar reli-
gious communities in which there is less need for exchange between family members have
rules that weaken family ties. My model has implications for understanding selection into
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1 Introduction
One of the most important functions of religion is to regulate the family. From birth, to
child raising, to marriage, to the care of elderly parents, religious teachings prescribe rules
governing every aspect of family life. However, the literature on the economics of religion
has so far ignored this family-regulating function. How do religious groups influence family
relationships? Who chooses to join family-regulating religious groups? How can these groups
persist over many generations? This paper tries to answer some of these questions.
I argue that religious institutions provide community enforcement of contracts within
families. Contracts between family members differ from contracts between unrelated indi-
viduals because while family members may want to commit to contracts ex ante, family
altruism implies that family members do not want to expose each other to punishment ex
post by reporting broken contracts to the community. Thus the community must not only
inflict punishment but must also monitor contract performance. However, the community
has less information than the family about each family member’s actions. As a result,
community enforcement of family contracts is inefficient. I describe this inefficiency in the
context of a society in which community enforcement of family contracts is particularly
important, namely the Amish.
More specifically, I argue that the most important service provided by Amish communi-
ties is to help parents to control their children. I develop an argument based on Bernheim,
Shleifer and Summers (1985). Parents would like their children to provide them with a
non-monetary good, which I refer to as care. In return, they would like to bequeath money
to their children. However, because parents are altruistic towards their children they cannot
commit to withholding bequests, even from children who do not provide care. As a result,
the level of care provided falls short of the parents’ optimum.
The Amish community ameliorates this problem by imposing rules on all members of
the community. Amish children are not allowed to attend school past the age of 14, and
Amish adults are not allowed to use a wide variety of productivity enhancing technologies,
including cars, electric tools and appliances, and many kinds of modern communication
and information technology. Together, these rules reduce the wages of adult children. As
a result, children who remain in the community spend less time working for a wage and
more time caring for their parents. Parents incentivize children to remain in the community
by committing to disinheriting children who leave. The reason parents can commit to
disinheriting children who leave the community, but not to disinheriting children who merely
fail to provide enough care, is that the community can observe whether children leave but
cannot directly observe how much care each child provides. The community then exerts
“peer pressure” on parents to disinherit children who leave, allowing parents to commit in
a way that they would be unable to do on their own. Because the community and not the
parents decide whether children should be punished, I say that Amish parents delegate the
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monitoring of their children to the community.
A community that allows parents to commit to disinheriting children can help parents
to control their children’s actions. However, this mechanism is useful only for parents
who are sufficiently rich. Poorer parents find that the threat of disinheritance, even when
credible, is not sufficient to incentivize their children to remain in the community. To
solve this problem, some Amish communities go beyond merely helping parents to commit
individually. In some Amish communities, parents form a coalition where each parent agrees
to inflict an additional punishment on any child who leaves by “shunning” such children.
Since all the parents together can inflict a more severe punishment than any one parent
individually, these communities can collectively incentivize children to remain even when
each parent would be too poor to do so alone. In these communities, parents delegate not
just the monitoring of their children but also part of the punishment of their children to the
community.
In my model, Amish institutions are inefficient, in the sense that parents and children
could achieve a Pareto superior outcome if parents could commit to a bequest schedule
conditional their children’s actions. The delegation of monitoring to the community creates
the inefficiency in my model, because the community has less information about children’s
behavior than parents and so cannot impose optimal punishments for children who fail to
provide enough care. The second-best monitoring scheme chosen by the community inflicts
a deadweight loss by reducing children’s wages, hurting both children and their altruistic
parents.
I provide both qualitative and quantitative empirical evidence in favor of my model.
For my quantitative evidence, I make use of the Ohio Amish Directory, a listing of nearly
the entire Amish population of Holmes county, Ohio. I draw qualitative evidence from
anthropological and sociological accounts of the Amish and a closely related group, the
Hutterites. I have four findings. First, Amish households are not unitary, and there is
conflict between parents and children. Some children want to leave the church, while their
parents want them to stay. Second, Amish communities inflict punishments on children who
leave the church, helping to support parents in this conflict. Third, without the support
of the community Amish parents have difficulty in committing to punish their children.
Fourth, Amish community membership strengthen family ties, while religious groups with
similar theological beliefs and presumably similar preferences but in which parents have less
need for care from their children have rules that weaken family ties. I argue that together,
these findings provide strong support for my model.
My model is closely related to and inspired by the seminal club goods model of reli-
gion, developed by Iannacone (1992). However, there are some important differences. In
the club goods model, religious groups impose rules to make people substitute away from
private consumption and towards contributing to a religious club good that benefits the
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entire community. In my model, the religious group also imposes rules that make children
substitute away from private consumption, but the children substitute towards actions that
benefit their parents rather than the whole community. This distinction has empirical con-
sequences. Iannacone argues that religious groups described by the club goods model are
most attractive to the poor. In contrast, in my model the purpose of the religious group is
to allow parents to commit to using their resources in a wider variety of ways. This service
is more useful to parents who have more resources, and so religious groups described by my
model are most attractive to rich parents. Children of rich parents are also more likely to
remain members of religious groups described by my model.
In reality many religious groups probably encourage group members both to take actions
that benefit the whole community and to take actions that benefit their families. However,
different religious groups differ in the extent to which they emphasize these different goals.
Keeping this distinction in mind can help to reconcile seemingly contradictory empirical
results. Iannacone finds that the poor are more likely to join strict Christian religious sects,
while Botticini and Eckstein (2012) find that the rich were more likely to join ancient Jewish
communities. Similarly, Chen (2010) finds that an exogenous decrease in income increases
religious participation among Muslims in Indonesia, while Buser (2015) finds that an ex-
ogenous increase in income increases religious participation among Christians in Ecuador.
Buser also finds that an exogenous increase in income makes people more likely to identify
as evangelical Protestants rather than Catholics. I argue that these results indicate the
existence of more than one kind of religious group. Right-wing religious groups empha-
size “family values” and attract rich members, while left-wing religious groups emphasize
community and charity and attract poor members.
The idea that some community members might form a coalition to prevent other com-
munity members from leaving also appears in other papers. Abramitzky (2008), Munshi and
Rosenzweig (2006), and Munshi and Rosenzweig (2015) study communities where there is
significant redistribution between member households.1 In these communities richer house-
holds subsidize poorer households, and so rich households want to exit the community
while poorer households want to force the richer households to stay. Poor households in
these communities then form coalitions in various ways to increase the cost of leaving for
rich households. In my model, there is also conflict in the community, but the conflict is
not between rich and poor households but rather between parents and children within the
same household. The coalition that forms is then not poor households trying to force rich
households to stay, but rather parents from all households trying to force children from all
households to stay.
My paper is also related to the community enforcement literature. A central concern in
this paper is the information structure of the community, which determines how the commu-
1Abramitzky studies the Israeli kibbutzim, while Munshi and Rosenzweig study the Indian caste system.
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nity finds out when contract violations have occurred. Early contributions to this literature,
such as Kandori (1992) and Greif (1993), assume that members of the community can cost-
lessly observe when other members have broken contracts. More recent contributions, such
as Bowen, Kreps and Skryzpacz (2013) and Ali and Miller (2015) assume instead that the
parties to a contract must report to the community whether the contract has been fulfilled.
These papers construct equilibria in which each party to a contract is just indifferent between
reporting that the contract has been fulfilled and that the contract has been broken, so that
it is incentive compatible for each party to report the outcome of the contract truthfully. I
assume that the community cannot observe the outcomes of the contracts between families,
and also that because of family altruism family members always strictly prefer not to report
broken contracts to the community. This problem necessitates the inefficient community
monitoring scheme in my model.
Finally, my paper is related to theories of cultural evolution developed by Boyd and
Richerson (1985) and Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001). Both of these theories attempt to
explain the existence of cultural behaviors that are seemingly welfare reducing relative to
some apparently feasible alternative. Both theories deny that these seemingly welfare reduc-
ing cultural behaviors are really welfare reducing. Boyd and Richerson argue that cultural
behaviors are “rules of thumb” for boundedly rational agents. Conditional on bounded ra-
tionality, agents maximize their welfare by applying these rules when they cannot discover
the unconditionally optimal action. Bisin and Verdier argue that seemingly welfare reducing
cultural behaviors are in fact optimal responses by agents who have unusual preferences.
A similar argument appears in Akerlof and Kranton (2000). In contrast to these theories,
I argue that Amish culture really is welfare reducing relative to a world in which Amish
parents and children could enter into complete contracts.
In addition to explaining why seemingly welfare reducing cultural behaviors exist, my
theory has implications for understanding when and how minority cultural traits can persist
across generations. There are two main theories of cultural persistence in the economics
literature. Lazear (1999) and Michalopoulos (2012) argue that it is difficult for members of
minority cultural groups to learn the majority language, and that this technological barrier
prevents minority groups from assimilating into the majority. Bisin and Verdier (2000,
2001) argue that parents in minority groups prefer that their children share the parents’
cultural traits, and that the parents also pass this preference on to their children. These
preferences then sustain the distinctiveness of the minority group. In contrast to these
theories, I argue that neither language barriers nor parental preferences on their own are
sufficient to sustain Amish cultural distinctiveness in the face of material incentives favoring
assimilation. However, a parental coalition dedicated to collective punishment of children
who assimilate into the majority culture can be very effective in preventing assimilation over
multiple generations.
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The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section II provides background on the Amish.
Section III presents the model. Section IV presents both qualitative and quantitative empir-
ical evidence regarding the Amish. Section V provides further evidence from other religious
groups. Section VI concludes.
2 Background on the Amish
The Amish are one of several Protestant sects, collectively known as Anabaptists, which
emerged in Switzerland and Germany in the aftermath of the Protestant Reformation.2 The
Anabaptists were among the most radical Protestant groups, in the sense that they went the
furthest in rejecting the traditional authority structures of medieval life. In particular the
Anabaptists rejected the traditional church hierarchy, instead holding meetings in private
homes with lay preachers, and they also denied the right of the ruler of a territory to
determine the religion of the territory’s inhabitants. The Anabaptists believed instead that
each person should make an informed choice of what religion to belong to on reaching
adulthood. One consequence of this belief was that the Anabaptists did not practice infant
baptism, hence their name. The Amish denomination was founded in 1693 in Switzerland
by Jakob Amman, who split from the existing Anabaptist congregations over the issue of
shunning. I discuss shunning in more detail below.
The Amish faced persecution in Europe due to their religious beliefs, and as a result
many Amish people emigrated to the United States and Canada in the 18th and 19th
centuries. The remaining Amish church in Europe did not prosper, and the last European
Amish congregation disbanded in 1937. In the Americas, however, the Amish church grew
quickly. Table 1 shows Amish population estimates from 1900 to the present. This growth
is due almost entirely to the high Amish fertility rate and not to conversion into the Amish
church from outside, which is nearly impossible. In fact the Amish population has long been
a subject of genetic research due to its extreme genetic isolation.
Amish theology emphasizes humility, simplicity, sublimation of personal desire, and sur-
render to God’s will. One aspect of this theology is separation from the outside world, which
the Amish regard as materialistic and corrupt. As part of their separation from the outside
world, the Amish speak a dialect of German called Pennsylvania German, which is related to
the dialect of southern Germany where the Amish faith originated. Amish children are also
taught to read standard German, and Amish church services are held in standard German
using Martin Luther’s 1534 German translation of the Bible, although fluency in standard
German varies widely. Most Amish people are also fluent in English and speak English with
outsiders.
2This overview of Amish history, culture, and institutions is drawn from Beachy (2011), Hostetler (1993),
Hurst and McConnell (2010), Kraybill (2001), and Kraybill, Johnson-Weiner, and Nolt (2013).
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2.1 Amish community organization
Contemporary Amish society is organized into settlements, affiliations, and districts. A
settlement is a geographical area with many Amish people. The largest settlement, cen-
tered in Holmes county, Ohio, and including parts of six surrounding counties, has more
than 30,000 members. There are two other settlements of similar size, in Lancaster county,
Pennsylvania, and Elkhart and Lagrange counties, Indiana, and many smaller settlements.
When these settlements were originally formed they were located in rural areas, and tra-
ditionally all Amish men were farmers. However, in recent years urban development has
encroached on Amish settlement areas and now many parts of the larger Amish settlements
are more suburban or exurban than rural. Urban expansion and rising land prices have led
many Amish people to abandon farming for other trades. In the Holmes county settlement,
which is the main object of study in this paper, many Amish men work as artisanal crafts-
men in areas such as woodworking and masonry, or as small business owners in businesses
such as retail or construction. Other Amish men work as unskilled or semi-skilled laborers,
including for non-Amish employers. Finally, some Amish men remain in the traditional
occupation of farming. Married women rarely work outside the home. Settlements do not
have well-defined borders, and within each settlement Amish people and non-Amish people
live side by side.
Except in the Lancaster county, Pennsylvania settlement, there are no settlement-wide
governance institutions. Governance instead happens at the level of the district. A district
is a collection of 20-40 households that meets once every two weeks in a member’s house or
barn to hold religious services. The size of a district is limited by the number of people who
can fit in a house or barn for the service, and when a district becomes too large, it splits.
Each district is responsible for making and enforcing its own rules, which I describe in more
detail below. Rules must be agreed upon unanimously by all adult members of the church
at special meetings held twice each year. While in principle all members have an equal say
in these meetings, in practice the district leader, known as the bishop, has significantly more
power than other district members through his ability to set the agenda. Bishops are chosen
for life from among the male elders of each district through a complex procedure that is
partly an election but that also involves elements of chance. All adult district members,
both male and female, have a vote in these elections.
Amish society features a substantial amount of mutual insurance and redistribution, and
much of this insurance is organized at the level of the district. For example, each district
has an officer called the deacon, whose responsibilities include managing an alms fund for
less fortunate district members. Wealthier district members may also be required to pro-
vide no-interest loans for poorer members to buy houses or start businesses. At the same
time, however, Amish church members are typically required to refrain from taking advan-
tage of insurance and redistributive institutions provided by the larger society. The Amish
7
are specifically exempted from mandatory participation in Social Security and government-
provided health insurance, and usually do not accept workplace-provided health insurance
or government-provided aid to the poor such as food stamps. Overall it is unclear whether
Amish insurance and redistributive institutions provide more or less insurance and redistri-
bution than the institutions of the larger society that they replace.
While each district is responsible for deciding its own rules, in most cases groups of
districts choose similar rules. A group of districts with similar rules is called an affiliation,
and two districts in the same affiliation are said to be “in fellowship”. Districts in fellowship
may exchange guest preachers for Sunday services. In the Holmes county, Ohio settlement,
there are three major affiliations, the Old Order, the New Order, and the Andy Weaver
affiliation. (A fourth major affiliation, the Swartzentrubers, are not included in my data
set and so are not considered in this study.) The Old Order are the largest affiliation and
represent the main line of the Amish tradition, going back to the Amish settlement of Ohio
in the 19th century. The Andy Weaver affiliation split from the Old Order in 1954 and the
New Order split from the Old Order in 1958.
2.2 Amish rules
Amish districts impose many rules on their members. Roughly speaking, these rules fall
into four categories. First, there are rules about the use of technology. Second, there are
rules about family life and child raising. Third, there are rules about dress and appearance.
Fourth, there are rules about the punishment of district members who break the other rules
of the district.
Amish rules about the use of technology are the aspect of Amish culture that is perhaps
best known to outsiders. The rules forbid the use of a wide variety of modern technologies.
Most notably, all districts prohibit driving cars. Instead Amish people travel in horse-drawn
buggies, and these buggies are a common sight on roads in and near Amish settlements.
Many districts also have rules about the use of other kinds of transportation and motorized
equipment. For example, many districts have rules about the use of tractors. Some districts
permit all tractors, some districts permit only tractors with steel wheels, which cannot be
driven on the road, and some districts forbid tractors entirely. Some districts also pro-
hibit bicycles. Most Amish districts prohibit the use of electricity from the grid, although
some districts permit electric appliances powered by gas generators. Finally, most districts
have rules against modern communication and information technology such as telephones
and computers, although the extent to which these technologies are prohibited varies from
district to district.
Amish districts have many rules and customs regarding child raising and family life,
including rules about proper gender roles in marriage, courtship customs, and child disci-
pline. From the perspective of an economist the most important of these rules is the rule
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prohibiting children from attending school past the age of 14. This rule is followed in all
districts, and as a result all Amish people have the same amount of education.3 The Amish
were specifically exempted from mandatory state education laws in the 1972 Supreme Court
case Wisconsin v. Yoder.
Rules about dress and appearance serve to distinguish the Amish visually from non-
Amish people. Men and women both dress modestly, and men have beards but not mous-
taches and distinctive haircuts. There are subtle differences between the clothing required
by different affiliations, such as different rules across affiliations concerning the width of
brims for men’s hats. For someone familiar with the culture it is possible to distinguish
members of different affiliations in this way.
Districts enforce the rules using a penalty called shunning. A shunned member is not
allowed to interact in certain ways with church members in good standing. For example, it
is forbidden to share a meal with or to accept gifts from someone who has been shunned,
although interestingly it is still permitted to give gifts to a shunned member. Shunning may
be temporary or permanent. Temporary shunning lasts for two to six weeks and is a response
to less serious violations of the rules. A church member who repeatedly breaks the rules, or
who refuses to show remorse for past rule-breaking, may be permanently shunned. Perma-
nent shunning lasts indefinitely, but even a member who has been permanently shunned may
be accepted back into the community after making a confession and repenting in front of the
congregation. Information about shunning is shared across districts in the same affiliation,
and if it is discovered that a person has been shunned in his or her home district, members
of other districts in the same affiliation will respect the prohibition against interacting with
that person.
As I discuss below, in some cases church members may be shunned for voluntarily leaving
the church, even if they have not otherwise done anything wrong. Church members who
leave but who are not shunned may continue to interact with their friends and family who
remain Amish, and in fact such continued interaction is common. Continued interaction is
possible because leaving the church does not necessarily imply moving geographically. For
example, Amish parents may rely on their children who have left the church to run errands
that require access to a car.
2.3 Variation in rules across districts
The Amish describe the variation in rules and ideology across affiliations as being on a
scale from “low” to “high”. Lower affiliations are more removed from the outside world,
while higher affiliations interact more with non-Amish society. Of the three affiliations that
I study in this paper, the Andy Weaver affiliation is the lowest, the Old Order is in the
3Kraybill (2001, p. 81) reports the results of a survey of educational attainment among 812 Amish adults
in Lancaster county, Pennsylvania. He finds zero who have more than an eighth grade education.
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middle, and the New Order is the highest.
Districts in low affiliations typically are more restrictive about technology use than high
affiliations. For example, districts in lower affiliations may forbid bicycles, tractors, and
gas-powered appliances, while districts in higher affiliations may permit the use of these
technologies. Interestingly, the scale is reversed when it comes to rules about family life and
child-rearing practices. Parents in lower affiliations are somewhat more lenient than parents
in higher affiliations in allowing their children to hold unsupervised social events, and lower
affiliations are more accepting of alcohol and tobacco use than higher affiliations.
Although there are some differences between affiliations in the rules governing technol-
ogy use and family life, these differences are not the most important differences between
affiliations. Instead, the central point of disagreement between affiliations concerns the
proper use of shunning. Districts that have similar attitudes towards shunning are likely
to be in fellowship even if they have divergent attitudes towards technology or family life.
For example, the Lancaster county, Pennsylvania Amish districts are in fellowship with the
Andy Weaver affiliation in Ohio, because they share the same policies regarding shunning,
even though the Lancaster county Amish permit the use of more modern technologies than
the Andy Weaver affiliation.
Affiliations disagree in particular about the extent to which shunning should be applied
to members who have voluntarily left the church but who have not otherwise done anything
wrong. The Andy Weaver affiliation practices strict shunning or streng meidung. This means
that any member who leaves the church is permanently shunned. In principle this penalty
applies even to members who leave to join a higher Amish affiliation, although in practice
there is some leeway for members who leave the Andy Weaver affiliation but remain Amish.
Shunning can be ended only if the wayward member returns to an Andy Weaver district.
In the Old Order, shunning practices vary from district to district and from case to case.
Members who leave to join other Amish affiliations are rarely shunned. Members can also
usually leave to join other Anabaptist denominations without incurring a penalty. This typ-
ically means joining the Mennonites, an Anabaptist group that is theologically very similar
to the Amish but which does not impose nearly as many rules on its members. The area of
the Holmes county settlement also includes many Mennonites, and so there is an alternative
community available for people who leave the Amish church. Members who leave to join
other Christian denominations, or who become atheists, are more likely to be shunned by
their former Old Order districts. New Order districts do not shun former members as long
as those members join a “Bible-believing church”, and many New Order Amish believe that
the practice of shunning should be abandoned completely. In principle, it is possible for chil-
dren to leave any affiliation without incurring a penalty if they leave before being baptised,
where baptism typically happens in the late teens or early twenties. In practice, however,
there is considerable social pressure on children to be baptised. Community members may
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also “draw back” from interaction with children who leave the church before being baptised,
even if the children are not officially shunned. Like the official punishment of shunning, this
unofficial punishment is more likely to be applied by lower affiliations.
3 Theory
In this section I develop a model to explain the unique features of Amish society described
above. In particular I want to explain why the Amish church imposes productivity reducing
rules, such as rules limiting children’s education and rules against using modern technologies,
and why some Amish districts shun former members who have left the church. I argue that
these features of Amish society allow parents to control their children in ways that would
be impossible in the absence of the rules.
The model is as follows. Society consists of parents and children. Each parent (she) has
one child (he). Each child has one unit of time, which can be allocated either to working
for a wage w or to caring for his parent. Each child’s utility is
uc(xc, t)
where xc is the child’s consumption and t is the time that the child spends caring for
the parent. Parents are altruistic towards their children. Each parent gets utility from her
own consumption, from time that the child spends caring for her, and also from her child’s
utility. Each parent’s utility function is
up(xp, t, uc(xc, t))
where xp is the parent’s consumption. I assume that both the parent’s and the child’s
utility functions are increasing in all of their arguments. Each parent is endowed with
wealth y which she can either consume or bequeath to the child. Let b be the amount of
the bequest. The parent’s budget constraints are
xp + b ≤ y
b ≥ 0
The child’s budget constraints are
xc ≤ w(1− t) + b
0 ≤ t ≤ 1
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The child first chooses his allocation of time between working and caring for the parent,
and the parent then chooses her bequest.
After observing the child’s choice of t and the child’s wage w, the parent effectively
chooses her own and her child’s consumption subject to the constraint that bequests must
be non-negative and that total consumption must be less than or equal to the sum of the
resources controlled by the parent and the child. The parent’s optimization problem can be
written as
max
xp,xc
up(xp, t, uc(xc, t))
subject to the constraints
xp + xc ≤ y + (1− t)w
xc ≥ (1− t)w.
Let xc(t, w) be the solution to this problem for each choice of t by the child. I assume
that xc is a normal good for the parent, that is, that xc(t, w) is weakly increasing in w and y
for all t. The child’s problem is then to choose a point on the xc(t, w) curve to maximize his
utility. Figure 1 displays this problem graphically. The kink in the xc(t, w) curve represents
the level of t below which the parent does not give the child a bequest. As can be seen in the
figure, as w decreases the child’s equilibrium utility falls. Since xc(t, w) is also increasing in
y, the same argument shows that as y decreases the child’s equilibrium utility falls.
In contrast, an decrease in w may increase the parent’s equilibrium utility. To show this,
I take the derivative of the parent’s utility function with respect to w to get:
dup
dw
=
∂up
∂xp
∂xp
∂w
+
∂up
∂t
∂t
∂w
+
∂up
∂uc
∂uc
∂xc
∂xc
∂w
+
∂up
∂uc
∂uc
∂t
∂t
∂w
(1)
In analyzing this expression, it is helpful to consider separately the case in which the
parent gives a positive bequest and the case where the parent gives no bequest. Suppose
first that the parent gives no bequest. In this case ∂xp/∂w = 0, so equation (1) simplifies
to
dup
dw
=
∂up
∂t
∂t
∂w
+
∂up
∂uc
duc
dw
(2)
The second term on the right hand side of (2) is positive but the first term may be
negative, if ∂t/∂w is negative. If the first term is sufficiently negative then dup/dw is
negative. Intuitively, increasing w causes the child to substitute away from caring for the
parent and towards working for a wage. This increases the child’s utility, which increases
the parent’s utility, but the decrease in t lowers the parent’s utility. If the decrease in the
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parent’s utility from the decrease in t is sufficiently large, then the overall effect on the
parent’s utility may be negative.
Now consider the case in which the parent gives the child a positive bequest. In this
case, noting that xc +xp = y+ (1− t)w and therefore that ∂xc/∂w+∂xp/∂w = (1− t), and
also that ∂up/∂xp = (∂up/∂uc)(∂uc/∂xc) since the parent chooses her bequest optimally,
equation (1) simplifies to
dup
dw
= (1− t)∂up
∂xp
+
∂t
∂w
(
∂up
∂t
+
∂up
∂uc
∂uc
∂t
)
(3)
When the parent makes a positive bequest to the child, while holding the child’s time
allocation constant an increase in the child’s wage has the same effect as a direct increase in
the parent’s consumption, since the parent can trade off her own consumption one-for-one
with the child’s consumption. The first term of (3), which is positive, represents this effect
of an increase in the child’s wage on the parent’s utility. The second term represents the
effect of a change in t due to a change in the child’s wage on the parent’s utility. As before,
if ∂t∂w is negative, then this second term is negative, and if
∂t
∂w is sufficiently negative, then
dup/dw may be negative.
Whether or not the parent leaves the child a bequest, then, it is possible that a decrease
in w increases the parent’s utility. Proposition 1 summarizes the previous discussion:
Proposition 1 If the child’s consumption xc is a normal good for the parent, then
1. A decrease in w always weakly reduces the child’s equilibrium utility.
2. A decrease in y always weakly reduces the child’s equilibrium utility.
3. A decrease in w may increase the parent’s equilibrium utility.
So far my analysis is very similar to the analysis in Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers
(1985).4 I now introduce a new element by modifying the game to consider the role of the
Amish community in helping the parent to impose her wishes on the child. Suppose that
the child can either become a member of the Amish church or not. If the child is not a
member of the church, then the child receives wage w¯. The church imposes restrictions on
the child’s education and on the productive technologies that the child can use, so that if
the child becomes a member of the church then the child receives wage w, where w < w¯.
Let m denote the child’s membership in the church, where m = 1 if the child is a member of
the church and m = 0 otherwise. In addition, the parent can partially commit to a bequest
schedule that depends on whether the child is a member of the church or not. In particular,
the parent can commit to leaving the child a bequest b(m) = 0 if m = 0. However, if the
child does join the church the parent cannot commit to any bequest.
4See also Ghosh and Karaivanov (2007).
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The idea here is that the Amish community can observe whether the child is a member
of the church, and whether the child follows the rules of the church if he is a member,
but cannot directly observe how much care the child provides to the parent. If the child
leaves the church, the Amish community exerts “peer pressure” on the parent to withhold
a bequest from the child, as in Kandel and Lazear (1992). Thus the parent can commit
to disinheriting a child who leaves the church. However, the community cannot bring its
influence to bear on the parent if the child merely fails to provide enough care. As a result
the parent cannot commit to a bequest schedule conditional the amount of care that the
child provides.
The timing of the new game is as follows:
1. Parent chooses whether to commit to b(0) = 0.
2. Child chooses whether to join the church.
3. Child chooses t.
4. If the parent did not commit to b(0) = 0 in step 1, or if the child chose to join the
church in step 2, the parent chooses a bequest b ≥ 0. Otherwise the parent gives the
child no bequest.
Now consider how the parent’s wealth affects the child’s decision to join the church. Let
vp(w, y) be the equilibrium utility of a parent who has not committed to b(0) = 0, who has
wealth y, and whose child receives wage w. I make the following assumption:
Assumption 1
For all y,
vp(w, y) > v(w¯, y)
Assumption 1 states that each parent prefers that her child join the church, even though
doing so lowers the child’s wage. Assumption 1 implies that children who join the church
provide more care to their parents than children who do not, since the only reason that
the parent might want the child to join the church is to induce the child to provide more
care. Let vc(w, y) be the equilibrium utility of a child whose parent has not committed to
b(0) = 0, who receives wage w, and whose parent has wealth y. If the child’s consumption
is a normal good for the parent, then from proposition 1, vc(w, y) is increasing in both y
and w. If the child joins the church, then he gets utility vc(w, y), while if he does not join
the group then he gets utility vc(w¯, 0). For sufficiently large y, vc(w, y) > vc(w¯, 0), and so
if the parent commits to disinheriting the child if the child does not join the church, then
the child prefers to join the church.
Proposition 2 summarizes the previous discussion:
14
Proposition 2 Suppose that the child’s consumption is a normal good for the parent and
that assumption 1 holds. Then there exists y¯ such that the following strategies are part of a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium:
1. If and only if y < y¯, the parent does not commit to disinheriting the child if the child
does not join the church, and the child does not join the church.
2. If and only if y ≥ y¯, the parent commits to disinheriting the child if the child does not
join the church, and the child joins the church.
Proposition 2 states that children of rich parents join the church while children of poor
parents do not. The reason is that the parent’s threat to disinherit the child if he does not
join the church is effective only if the parent is sufficiently rich.
Now, suppose that the community can inflict an additional punishment p on a child
who does not join the group. Then the utility of a child who does not join the group is
vc(w¯, 0)− p. We have the following:
Proposition 3 The cutoff parental wealth y¯ below which a child does not join the group is
decreasing in p.
The punishment p in the model corresponds to the real-world probability that the child
will be shunned if he leaves the Amish church. Thus p is larger in lower Amish affiliations,
and so my model predicts that children are less likely to exit from lower affiliations.
I make two remarks on the properties of the equilibria described above:
Remark 1 The equilibria I describe are Pareto inefficient.
The wage penalty for being a member of the Amish church is a deadweight loss. Both
the parent and the child would be better off if the child could leave the church and get
a higher wage while maintaining the same bequest and care levels. However, because the
parent cannot commit either to disinheriting the child for failing to provide enough care, or
to reporting the child’s misbehavior to the community for punishment by the community,
this Pareto improving allocation cannot be achieved.
Remark 2 Religious group membership is most attractive to rich parents.
The religious group has no effect on the child’s behavior if the parent has wealth less than
the cutoff y¯. Thus for poor parents, religious group membership has no value. In contrast,
the religious group causes the child to provide more care to the parent if the parent has
wealth greater than the cutoff, and so religious group membership may increase the utility
of rich parents. Thus, not only are children of rich parents more likely to remain members
of the religious group, but rich parents are also more likely to join the group if they have
the opportunity to do so.
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3.1 Comparison to the club goods model
I briefly compare the predictions of my model to the club goods model. For a detailed
presentation of the club goods model, see Iannacone (1992).
In the club goods model, religious group members can allocate resources either to pri-
vate consumption or to contributions to a religious club good that benefits all members
of the community. Because contributions to the club good yield positive externalities for
other members of the community, contributions to the club good are undersupplied in Nash
equilibrium relative to the social optimum. The religious group imposes rules prohibiting
certain kinds of private consumption in order to make people substitute away from private
consumption and towards contributions to the club good. Iannacone shows that under some
circumstances, these rules may be welfare improving for all members of the community.
In the context of the club goods model, altruistic expenditures of time or money to
benefit family members are just another kind of private consumption. Thus, religious groups
described by the club goods model may be neutral towards the family, or they may even
make rules that decrease the quantity of resources that group members devote to their
families in order to encourage group members to contribute those resources to the community
instead. This implication of the club goods model sharply contrasts with my model, in which
the religious group makes rules designed to increase the quantity of resources that group
members devote to their families.
Iannacone is agnostic about exactly what religious group members contribute to the
community. As an example, he suggests enthusiastic participation in religious services.
However, the following literature has argued that the most important religious club good
is charitable contributions of time or money to aid poorer or less fortunate members of
the community. This interpretation of the club good as mutual insurance or redistribution
appears in Berman (2000), Dehejia, DeLeire, and Luttmer (2007), and Chen (2010).
Religious groups that provide significant amounts of aid or redistribution are likely to be
most attractive to the poor. In contrast, as discussed above religious groups described by
my model are likely to be most attractive to rich parents, and children of rich parents are
also more likely to remain members of these groups. This is a second important distinction
between my model and the club goods model.
The previous discussion suggests an empirical correlation. Religious groups described by
my model feature relatively little redistribution, attract rich members, and have rules that
increase the quantity of resources that group members devote to their families. Religious
groups described by the club goods model feature significant redistribution, attract poor
members, and have rules that are neutral towards the family or that reduce the quantity of
resources that group members devote to their families. Thus I make the following prediction,
which for consistency with the previous results I state as a “proposition”:
Proposition 4 There is a correlation between the amount of redistribution in a religious
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group, the wealth of the religious group’s members, and the religious group’s attitude towards
the family. Religious groups with relatively less redistribution have rules that increase the
quantity of resources that family members devote to each other and that strengthen family
ties, and these groups attract wealthier members. Religious groups with relatively more
redistribution may have rules that decrease the quantity of resources that family members
devote to each other and that weaken family ties, and these groups attract poorer members.
In the next section I test this hypothesis together with the implications of propositions
1 through 3.
4 Empirics
In this section I provide empirical evidence that the mechanism described above explains
Amish institutions. The argument proceeds in four steps. First, I argue that Amish house-
holds are not unitary. In particular, at least some Amish children prefer to leave the church,
while their parents want them to stay. Second, I argue that Amish communities support
parents in this conflict by helping to punish children who leave the church. Third, I argue
that without support from the community, parents have difficulty committing to punishing
their children. Finally, I argue that Amish parents want their children to join the church
because church membership strengthens family ties. I argue that together, these four claims
establish that the mechanism described above is at least part of the explanation for Amish
rules. Before proceeding with the argument, however, I describe my data sources.
4.1 Data
I combine data from two sources. The first source is the Amish directory for the Holmes
county settlement. The Amish directory is a list of all the households in the settlement, with
the exception of households in the Swartzentruber affiliation who do not participate. It is
published irregularly every 5-10 years. For each household, it contains the names and birth
dates of all members of the household, the profession of the household head, and the names
of all of the children of the household head and the spouse of the household head. For each
child the directory states whether the child is a member of the Amish church and whether
the child lives in the settlement. The directory also gives addresses for each child. The main
outcome variables that I am interested in are whether a child leaves the church and whether
a child migrates geographically. I consider a child to have migrated if the child is a member
of the Amish church living in a different settlement, or if the child is not a member of the
Amish church and has an address in a state other than Ohio. It is important to emphasize
that leaving the church and migrating are independent decisions, and I observe children who
have left the church but not migrated who have migrated but not left the church, both, and
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neither.
I make use of two editions of the Amish directory, the 1988 edition and the most recent
2010 edition. My sample is all children between the ages of 8 and 16 who are living in the
settlement in 1988. I match this sample with the 2010 directory in order to find outcomes
for children in 2010, when the children are between the ages of 30 and 38. Since decisions
to leave the church are mostly made early in life, it is likely that most of these children have
permanently chosen their religious status by age 30. I observe children’s outcomes through
entries for their parents in the 2010 Amish directory, so I am able to observe outcomes even
for children who have left the church or who have migrated, as long as their parents remain
members of the Holmes county Amish church. I do not observe outcomes for children of
parents who die between 1988 and 2010, or for children of parents who leave the church
or the settlement between 1988 and 2010. I am able to observe outcomes for 93% of the
children in my sample.
I match this data with 1988 property tax data collected from the county treasurer’s offices
of the counties that contain the Holmes county settlement. Not surprisingly the majority
of the children in my sample live in Holmes county, but the settlement also includes parts
of neighboring Tuscarawas, Coshocton, Wayne, and Stark counties, Ohio. I observe the
assessed value of buildings and land owned by each parent in 1988. Table 2 shows summary
statistics.
The theoretical discussion above suggests that the wealth distribution of a religious group
is important for understanding the group’s economic function. Figure 2 shows a histogram
of the value of buildings owned by each household in my sample. There are two important
takeaways from figure 2. First, Amish households are relatively wealthy. The median value
of buildings owned by all households is $60,729, and the median value of buildings owned
by households who own any buildings is $66,200. The median value of all homes in Ohio
in 1988 was $60,957, so the Amish are as wealthy or perhaps slightly wealthier than other
Ohio households. This is remarkable given Amish restrictions on schooling and technology.
I hypothesize that Amish culture has non-cognitive benefits for children that compensate
for Amish educational deficits. Second, there is significant wealth inequality across Amish
households. There does not appear to be dramatically more redistribution among the Amish
than in the larger society.
I now proceed to argue that the data support my theory of Amish rules.
4.2 Step 1: Amish households are not unitary
The first step of my argument is to show that children of richer Amish parents are more
likely to remain in the church, consistent with proposition 2 above. I argue that this result
implies that Amish households are not unitary, and that some Amish parents want their
children to remain in the church while their children prefer to leave.
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To show that children of richer parents are more likely to remain in the church, I run
regressions of the form
Yihd = α+ β1Phd + β2Xihd + ihd
Here Yihd = 1 if child i in household h in district d has left the church by 2010, and
Yihd = 0 otherwise. Phd is a measure of the permanent income of the parents in household
h in district d in 1988, Xihd is a vector of control variables, and ihd is an error term. I
cluster error terms by district.
My preferred measure of the permanent income of household h is the logarithm of the
total value of buildings owned by the parents in household h in 1988. The value of buildings
owned by the household is a measure of the flow value of housing services consumed by the
household, which in turn is a (rough) proxy for the household’s permanent income. It is
important to note that the value of buildings owned by a household is not a proxy for the
value of that household’s asset holdings, since I do not observe the value of any mortgages
owed.
I also observe the value of land owned by each household. However using the value of
land owned by each household as a proxy for permanent income is problematic, for two
reasons. First, many households own significant amounts of agricultural land, which is a
productive asset rather than a durable consumption good, and so including land will create
an upward bias in the estimate of each household’s permanent consumption. Second, there
are two regulatory regimes for assessing land values for tax purposes in Ohio. Some parcels
of land are assessed at market value, while other parcels are assessed according to their
Current Agricultural Use Value (CAUV). CAUV values are lower than market values by up
to a factor of ten, and there is no easy way to convert CAUV values to market values. For
most households, I observe both the market value and the CAUV value of land. However, for
households in Wayne and Tuscarawas counties, I observe only the CAUV value for parcels
that fall under the CAUV regime. Thus, values of CAUV parcels in Wayne and Tuscarawas
counties are not comparable to parcels in other counties or to parcels in the same county
that do not fall under the CAUV regime. Despite these problems, as a robustness check I
also run regressions using the logarithm of the combined value of land and buildings owned
by a household as a measure of that household’s permanent income. In these regressions, I
drop observations from Wayne and Tuscarawas counties.
A significant number of households do not own any property. These households are pre-
sumably not homeless, but rather are either renting housing, or (more likely in this context)
living with other family members. Thus households who own no property are not properly
interpreted as households whose flow value of housing consumption is zero, but rather as
households whose flow value of housing is unobserved. Following this interpretation, in most
regressions I drop households who own no property.
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Table 3 reports results. Column 1 shows a regression with no controls other than affilia-
tion fixed effects. Children of richer parents are significantly less likely to leave the church,
consistent with proposition 2 above. Doubling the value of buildings owned by a household
reduces the probability that a child from that household leaves the church by 5 percentage
points, which is a large effect given the mean probability of leaving the church of 14.7%.
Column 2 adds control variables. The coefficient on parents’ wealth is similar to the
coefficient in the regression without controls. Children of farmers are significantly less likely
to leave the church than children of non-farmers. This is consistent with the fact that
farmers bequeath a larger fraction of their wealth to their children, as shown, for example,
by Behrman and Rosenzweig (2006). Thus for a given level of parental wealth the threat of
disinheritance is more severe for children of farmers than for children of non-farmers. Boys
are significantly more likely to leave the church than girls. This is likely due to the fact
that boys learn skills that make them employable in the market economy, while girls mainly
learn homemaking skills that are less useful outside of the Amish community. I also control
for each child’s age and the ages of the child’s mother and father.
One possible problem with the regression in column 2 is that different households may
spend different proportions of their total permanent income on housing, and these differences
may be correlated with other household characteristics that determine children’s propensity
to exit the church. In this case using housing consumption as a measure of permanent
income generates biased estimates of the effect of parents’ permanent income on children’s
propensity to exit the church. In order to partially control for this possibility, I include each
household’s completed fertility in 2010 as a control variable in column 3. Households with
higher fertility are likely to spend a larger fraction of their permanent income on housing.
Reassuringly, including this control does not meaningfully change the estimate of the effect
of parents’ wealth on the probability of exit.
Column 4 repeats the regression in column 2 using the logarithm of the total value of
buildings and land owned by each household as a measure of that household’s wealth. As
discussed above, in this regression I drop observations from Wayne and Tuscarawas counties.
The results are qualitatively similar to the results in column 2.
Column 5 regresses the probability of exit on an indicator for whether the child’s parents
own any property. There is no significant difference in exit rates between children of parents
who own property and children of parents who do not. This result supports the claim that
parents with no property are correctly interpreted as parents whose wealth is unobserved,
not parents whose wealth is zero.
Table 4 reports results from different subsamples. Columns 1 and 2 show results for
boys and girls separately. Parents’ wealth has a significant effect on the probability of
leaving the church only for boys, but the coefficients for boys and girls and close to each
other in magnitude. Columns 3 and 4 show results for children of farmers and children
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of non-farmers. The effect of parents’ wealth on children’s propensity to leave the church
appears to be larger for the children of farmers. This is consistent with the idea that farmers
bequeath a larger fraction of their wealth to their children, and so an increase in parents’
wealth increases the effective punishment for leaving the church more for children of farmers
than for children of non-farmers.
The broad result from tables 3 and 4 is that children of rich parents are less likely to
leave the church than children of poor parents. There are two possible explanations for this
finding. First, it may be the case that the return to physical or human capital investments
is greater in the Amish community than in the surrounding society. In this case the Roy
model predicts that rich households should prefer to remain Amish to take advantage of
these greater returns, while poorer households should prefer to exit. Second, it may be the
case that Amish households are not unitary, and that some Amish children prefer to leave
the community while their parents prefer that they stay. In this case parents bribe their
children to remain in the church by threatening to disinherit children who leave, and so
children of rich parents are more likely to remain in the church, as in proposition 2.
Given the likelihood that Amish people do not realize the full potential return to their
physical or human capital investments due to productivity restricting Amish rules, it is
implausible that the return to investment in the Amish community is greater than the
return to investment in the surrounding society. Therefore, I conclude from tables 3 and 4
that Amish households are not unitary, and that in at least some households the children
prefer to leave the church while their parents prefer that they remain. However, by itself this
result does not provide evidence for why a conflict between parents and children exists, and
it does not provide evidence for whether and how the community plays a role in mediating
intrahousehold conflict. For evidence on these questions I turn to the next step of the
argument.
4.3 Step 2: Amish community punishments help to retain children
in the church who would otherwise prefer to leave
The results of step 1 imply that there is conflict between Amish parents and their children.
Amish parents want their children to remain in the church, while the children prefer to leave.
Next I argue that Amish community rules, and in particular the punishment of shunning,
help to retain children in the church who would otherwise prefer to leave. Thus Amish
communities support parents in their conflict with their children.
I make this argument by comparing exit rates across different Amish affiliations. Figure
3 shows exit rates for the three affiliations covered by my dataset. The exit rate is highest for
the New Order, intermediate for the Old Order, and lowest for the Andy Weaver affiliation.
The differences between exit rates across affiliations are large. Recalling that the New Order
are least likely to shun children who leave, the Old Order are intermediate, and the Andy
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Weaver affiliation are most likely to shun, figure 3 provides strong evidence that shunning
helps to reduce exit rates. Thus the community helps to support parents’ desire to keep
children in the church even when children prefer to leave.
In table 5 I report the coefficients on affiliation fixed effects in a regression of the child’s
probability of exit on affiliation, controlling for child’s gender, child’s age, the age of both
parents, the father’s occupation, the logarithm of the value of buildings owned by the par-
ents, and an indicator for whether the parents own no property. Line 1 shows results from
the full sample. The results confirm that even after controlling for observable differences
between affiliations, there are large and statistically significant differences in exit rates be-
tween affiliations, consistent with the hypothesis that shunning helps to prevent children
from exiting the church, as in proposition 3.
A different view of the relationship between religious rules and exit rates from the re-
ligious community comes from the club goods model. In the club goods model, part of
the purpose of religious rules is to screen out members of the community who are less
likely to contribute to the club good. Thus in religious groups described by the club goods
model, religious rules increase the exit rate for at least some subset of the population. The
screening function of religious rules is emphasized by Berman (2000) and Campante and
Yanagizawa-Drott (2015). In order to test this mechanism I report exit rates by affiliation
after controlling for observables for various subsamples in lines 2 through 7 of table 5. In
every subsample, the exit rate is highest in the New Order, intermediate in the Old Order,
and lowest in the New Order. Thus, contrary to the predictions of the club goods model,
Amish rules do not serve to increase exit rates among any identifiable subset of the Amish
population.
The results in table 5 also have implications for understanding cultural persistence across
generations. Many authors have noted that minority cultures can often persist over time
even in the face of material incentives to assimilate into the larger society. Two theories
have been suggested in the economics literature for this persistence. Lazear (1999) and
Michalopoulos (2012) argue that minority cultures persist because of technological barriers
to assimilation. They argue that it is costly for speakers of minority languages to learn the
majority language, and this cost prevents speakers of minority languages from adopting the
majority culture. Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) argue that parents in minority cultures
have a preference for following the practices of the minority culture, and that they instill a
similar preference in their children. These unusual preferences ensure the persistence of the
minority culture even in the face of material benefits from assimilation. The results in table
5 suggest that neither technological barriers nor parental preferences are sufficient to prevent
substantial assimilation. In particular, without shunning the New Order affiliation is unable
to prevent substantial exit. In contrast, strict shunning by the Andy Weaver affiliation is
sufficient to reduce exit to very low levels. This suggests that a parental coalition aimed at
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punishing children who assimilate can prevent assimilation when technological barriers and
individual parental preferences cannot.
4.4 Step 3: Without the community, Amish parents have difficulty
committing to punishing their children
So far I have argued that there is conflict between Amish parents and Amish children, and
that by increasing the punishment for children who leave the church Amish communities
help to support parents in this conflict. Next, I argue that without the support of the
community parents have difficulty committing to punish their children.
The first piece of evidence for this claim is qualitative. Members of the Amish church in
good standing are more likely to shun excommunicated family members in public than in
private. Kraybill (2001, p. 139) describes this phenomenon as follows:
“The application of shunning varies widely from family to family. Many times it is
relaxed in private homes but tightened in public settings if other church members are present,
attesting to its ritual character and ceremonial role in the community. Many families treat
family members under the ban [that is, family members who have been shunned] with love
and care in the privacy of their homes. Despite its theological purposes, shunning is a painful
process. One woman said, ‘I’m not responsible for being born into a church that practices
shunning. I have an uncle and aunt and cousins in the ban, and it may separate us on a
social level, but it could never sever the cord of love.’”
Similarly, Hurst and McConnell (2010, p. 92) write:
“In some cases family and church members are less likely to take the hard line on shunning
when no one else is watching, as this ex-Swartzentruber male relates: ‘I have brothers that’ll
shun somebody right in front of the whole family, but when they’re by themselves, they
won’t.’”
In short, many Amish people do not want to shun their family members ex post, and
avoid doing so when they are not monitored by the community.
I also provide quantitative evidence that Amish parents cannot commit to disinheriting
their children without the support of the community. If Amish parents want their children
to remain in the church so that their children will provide them with more care, then the
parents may also want to prevent their children from migrating, again to increase the amount
of care that the children provide. However, migration is not against the rules of the church,
and so the church does not support parents who want to commit to disinheriting children
who migrate. Thus I predict that while children of richer Amish parents are less likely to
leave the church, there is no relationship between parent’s wealth and children’s propensity
to migrate. Table 5 tests this hypothesis by running regressions analogous to the regressions
in table 3, using an indicator for whether the child has migrated by 2010 as the dependent
variable.
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Column 1 of table 6 regresses an indicator for whether a child has migrated by 2010 on
the measure of parent’s wealth and an affiliation fixed effect. The effect of parents wealth
on migration is not statistically significant, and the coefficient is positive. Column 2 adds
control variables. The coefficient on parents wealth is qualitatively unchanged. Children of
farmers are less likely to migrate, and boys are more likely to migrate. Column 3 adds each
child’s completed number of siblings as a control, which also does not qualitatively affect the
results. Column 4 uses the alternate measure of parents’ wealth, which also yields similar
results.
Table 6 suggests that Amish parents’ wealth has no effect on children’s propensity to
migrate. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that Amish parents commit to dis-
inheriting children who leave the church, but cannot commit to disinheriting children who
migrate, and so the results provide some support to my theory. However the results are also
consistent with other hypotheses. In particular, parents’ wealth may have a positive effect
on children’s propensity to migrate by alleviating borrowing constraints in addition to any
negative effects due to the threat of disinheritance. Thus the results of table 5 should be
treated with caution.
4.5 Step 4: Amish parents want their children to follow the rules
of the Amish church because doing so strengthens family ties
Steps 1 through 3 of the argument establish that Amish parents and children are in conflict
about whether the children should follow the rules of the Amish church, and that the Amish
community supports parents in this conflict both by directly punishing children who leave
and by helping parents to commit to punishing children who leave. However, so far the
argument has not established why Amish parents want their children to follow the rules of
the church. In this section I argue that the reason parents want children to follow the rules
of the church is Amish church membership increases the quantity of resources that children
devote to their parents and strengthens family ties.
As a preliminary, it is helpful to define the main alternative hypothesis for why Amish
parents want their children to follow the rules of the church. The main alternative hypoth-
esis is that Amish parents want their children to avoid modern technology and advanced
education for some reason other than the effects of these choices on material outcomes. For
example, Amish parents may believe that education and use of modern technology lead
to morally corrupting contact with the outside world, that education and use of modern
technology lead to punishment in the afterlife, or that education and technology are just
intrinsically bad. Both my theory and these alternative theories are equally consistent with
the evidence in steps 1-3.
In order to distinguish between these possibilities, I compare Amish institutions with the
institutions of a closely related group, the Hutterites, whose society is described by Hostetler
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(1974). The Hutterites and the Amish share very similar histories and theological beliefs.
Like the Amish, the Hutterites are Anabaptists who migrated from Europe to the Americas
in order to escape religious persecution, and like the Amish, the Hutterites continue to
speak a dialect of German among themselves and to avoid many kinds of social contact
with outsiders. Present day Hutterites live primarily in the prairie provinces of Canada,
although some live in the northern plains states of the U.S. Hutterite theology, like Amish
theology, emphasizes humility, simplicity, and surrender of the individual will to the will of
God. In fact the Hutterites and the Amish use the same German word, Gelassenheit, to
refer to the ideal state of spiritual and ethical virtue.
While the Hutterites and the Amish share similar histories and theological beliefs, they
have different institutions and these institutions create different economic incentives. Most
importantly, Amish households own property separately. In contrast, Hutterites live in
agricultural communes called colonies, each with 70-150 members, and within the colony all
property is owned collectively. Production decisions are made by the elders of the colony,
and the output of the colony is shared equally among all members.
Because of their similar histories and theological beliefs, the Amish and the Hutterites
presumably have similar preferences. Thus, if Amish rules reflect non-material preferences
for avoiding technology and education, then the Hutterites should have similar preferences
and hence similar rules. In contrast, if Amish rules are meant to solve material incentive
problems, then the quite different incentive problems faced by the Hutterites suggest that
the Hutterites might impose different rules even if they have similar underlying preferences.
In particular, proposition 4 suggests that the Hutterites, with their much more extensive
redistribution than the Amish, should have rules that are more hostile to family life.
Some of the rules imposed by the Amish and the Hutterites are similar. Both the Amish
and the Hutterites have rules regarding dress and appearance, and these rules are nearly
identical across the two societies. Both the Amish and the Hutterites also restrict the use of
consumption technologies such as television. In other respects, though, Amish and Hutterite
rules are very different. The Hutterites place no restrictions on the use of productive tech-
nology. Members of Hutterite colonies drive cars and use modern agricultural technology,
including computerized and internet enabled devices for managing various aspects of farm
production. There are restrictions on education in the sense that decisions about whether
colony members are allowed to pursue higher education must be made by the entire colony.
However, many Hutterites graduate from high school, and some attend university. On the
other hand, the Hutterites place significant restrictions on family life that do not exist in
Amish society. Hutterite children are separated from their parents at the age of 2 and spend
most of their time in the colony kindergarten, being supervised and instructed by colony
teachers. All Hutterite meals are taken communally in the colony dining hall, and at meals
men, women, and children sit in separate sections, so that husbands do not eat with wives
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and parents do not eat with children. Hutterite children do share rooms for sleeping and
storing possessions with their parents, within larger apartment complexes on the Hutterite
colony property. However, the doors on these rooms typically have no locks and Hutterites
enter each other’s rooms without knocking, so that there is very little private family space.
Table 7 summarizes the differences between Amish and Hutterite rules.
The differences between Hutterite and Amish rules are consistent with the hypothesis
that Hutterite rules are meant to encourage people to contribute effort to communal pro-
duction, while Amish rules are meant to encourage people to spend more time with their
families. Time spent on private consumption, such as time spent watching television, sub-
tracts both from time devoted to family and from time devoted to the community, and
so both the Hutterites and the Amish restrict consumption technologies. However, Amish
and Hutterite attitudes towards productive technologies differ. For the Amish, time spent
on market production subtracts from time spent with family members, and so the Amish
impose restrictions on productive technology to increase time spent with family members.
In contrast, for the Hutterites effort contributed to communal production benefits the entire
community, and so it would make no sense for the Hutterite community to impose restric-
tions lowering the productivity of work effort. On the other hand, for the Hutterites time
devoted to family subtracts from time devoted to communal production, and so it does make
sense for the Hutterites to impose rules restricting time spent with families.
Given that the Hutterites and the Amish have very different rules regarding family life,
it would be reasonable to expect that Hutterite and Amish family relationships would differ,
and in fact this is the case. Hutterite families are not very close. Hostetler (1974, p. 203)
describes the relationship between the Hutterite colony and the Hutterite family as follows:
“The Hutterite colony functions in many ways like an extended family. Because Hutterite
society has institutionalized a continuing relationship between parents and children, the
family is emotionally less demanding and less exclusive than is the rule with middle-class
Americans.”
In contrast, the Amish believe that the rules of the church strengthen their family ties.
Kraybill and Nolt (1995, p. 126-127) explain Amish church rules preventing businesses from
growing too large as follows:
“[The Amish] worry that bigger establishments will weaken the involvement of the family.
One of the reasons they established small shops was to keep work integrated with family
life. A large business easily encroaches on family life, as entrepreneurs become engulfed in
manufacturing, sales, or bookkeeping. Although the community values hard work, it frowns
on jobs that completely dominate everything else. ‘A lot of Amish are workaholics,’ said
an Amishman who manufactures storage barns. ‘They pretty easily get too caught up in
their work. The church doesn’t want a business to get too awfully big, or pretty soon you’re
living for your job. You get too caught up in it. That’s not right.’”
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Amish families are in fact very closely knit. Kraybill (1989, p. 88) describes the impor-
tance of the Amish family as follows:
“The [Amish] family’s scope and influence dwarfs that of the modern nuclear family.
Amish life is spend in the context of the family. In contemporary families social functions
from birth to death, from eating to leisure, often leave the home. In contrast, Amish
activities are anchored at home. Children are usually born there. They play at home and
walk to school. By age fourteen, children work full-time in the home, shop, or farm. They
are taught by their extended family, not by television, babysitters, popular magazines, or
daycare teachers. Young couples are married at home. Church services rotate from home
to home. Most meals are eaten at home. Adults work at home or nearby.”
To summarize, the Amish and Hutterite rules differ in ways that are consistent with
the hypothesis that the rules of the two societies are designed to affect material outcomes,
and not consistent with the hypothesis that the Amish and the Hutterites have intrinsic
preferences for following rules that are unrelated to their material effects. In particular,
Amsih rules are designed to increase the amount of time that family members devote to
each other, while Hutterite rules are designed to reduce the amount of time that family
members devote to each other and to increase the amount of time that family members
devote to the community.
5 Further evidence
I have argued that strict religious groups can follow one of two patterns. Right-wing re-
ligious groups feature relatively less redistribution, attract rich members, and have rules
that increase the quantity of resources that family members devote to each other. Left-wing
religious groups feature relatively more redistribution, attract poor members, and have rules
that are neutral towards the family or that may even reduce the quantity of resources that
family members devote to each other. The Amish are an example of a right-wing religious
group, while the Hutterites are an example of a left-wing religious group. In this section, I
discuss some other examples of this dichotomy.
5.1 Quakers and Shakers
The Quakers are a Protestant sect that appeared in England in the 17th century. Many
Quakers subsequently migrated to the Americas, and in particular to Pennsylvania, in part
to escape persecution in England. The Shakers branched off from the Quakers in England
in the 18th century and subsequently also migrated to the Americas, primarily to upstate
New York and other parts of New England.
Quakers in colonial Pennsylvania owned private property, and Quaker society was both
relatively wealthy and relatively unequal. Table 8 shows data from the Philadelphia tax lists
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of 1754 and 1774, for the whole population and for Quakers. Each entry is the percentage of
households in each wealth category. Quakers appear to be richer than the overall population,
and there is also significant inequality within the Quaker community.
Quakers imposed many rules on their members, enforced through regular meetings at
which deviant members could be disciplined or possibly expelled from the church. Rules
emphasized “plain living” and prohibited many kinds of ostentatious consumption, drink-
ing, and gambling. Frost (1973, p. 56) lists the offenses that could be punished at Quaker
meetings, including “marriages without Friends’ [that is, Quakers] approval or by an An-
glican or Presbyterian clergyman, sexual offenses, drunkenness, gossip or slander, military
service or privateering, quarrelling or fighting, bankruptcy, going to law against a fellow
Quaker, dishonesty, profanity, swearing, playing cards, abusive behavior to wife or children,
and attendance at plays or horse races.”
One important purpose of these rules was to control children’s behavior. Frost (1973, p.
134) describes the process as follows:
“If parents found it impossible to control their children, they could always turn to the
meetings for help. The process was similar to that used in disciplining. At first a few Friends
would talk to the child privately. If he remained obstinate, the matter was presented to the
monthly meeting and an official delegation counseled him. If the youth still did not reform,
then the meeting took steps to disown him.”
Without the church rules, many Quaker parents had difficulty committing to disciplining
their children. Frost (1973, p. 134) writes:
“The necessity of repeated exhortations [by the Quaker community] to parents to incul-
cate in their children the value of plainness in speech and apparel and to restrain them from
mixing with the world must mean that some mothers and fathers slighted these duties.”
Frost (1973, p. 135) also recounts the following anecdote:
“James Logan [a Pennyslvania Quaker] once threatened disinheritance if his son did not
write home more often (Logan had received one letter in a year), but the threat was mostly
bluff, and Logan soon sent assurances that the boy would be well treated on his return.”
Possibly as a result of the community rules, Quaker families were tightly knit. Quakers
emphasized respect and companionship between husbands and wives. Marriage, according
to the Quakers, was a “blessed state entered into so that husband and wife might fulfill each
other intellectually, spiritually and physically.” (Frost 1973, p. 150). Children were highly
valued by their parents.
The Shakers held theological beliefs that were similar to the Quakers but had a very
different form of economic organization. Like the Hutterites, the Shakers lived in agricultural
communes in which all property was owned jointly and the output of the commune was
shared equally. One problem that arose from this practice was that poor outsiders would
attempt to join Shaker communities for the economic benefits, and not because they agreed
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with Shaker theology. Shakers described these free-riders as “winter Shakers” or “‘bread
and butter’ Believers”, who were “interested only in such short-term physical benefits, as
food, shelter, and clothing.” (Stein 1992, p. 162).
Shaker attitudes towards the family were also very different from Quaker attitudes.
Shakers practiced celibacy, and as a result members of Shaker communities did not have
spouses or biological children. Shaker communities sustained themselves instead by adopting
runaways and abandoned babies, and raising them communally. Shaker communities acted
in many ways as surrogate families, and in fact Shakers referred to their communities as
“families” and addressed each other as “brother” or “sister”.
To summarize the Quakers appear to be an example of a right-wing religious group in
my classification, while the Shakers are an example of a left-wing religious group. Quaker
society was relatively unequal and attracted the wealthy, and Quaker rules supported the
family. In contrast Shaker society was perfectly equal and attracted the poor, and Shaker
rules prevented the formation of biological families and encouraged people to contribute
instead to the community as a kind of surrogate family.
5.2 Sadducees, Pharisees, and Essenes
The Sadducees, Pharisees, and Essenes were Jewish sects that were prominent in Roman
Palestine during the Second Temple period, as described by the ancient historians Josephus
and Philo. The Sadducees and the Pharisees lived in Jerusalem and competed for politi-
cal control over the Temple and by extension over much of Jewish society. The Sadducees
represented the wealthy, while the Pharisees represented both wealthy and poorer classes
(Newman 2006, p. 58 and 76). Both the Sadducees and the Pharisees placed great impor-
tance on following the Jewish law, including rules forbidding many kinds of consumption. A
central function of the law was to help parents control children, as exemplified by the fifth
commandment, “Honor thy father and thy mother.”
In contrast to the Sadducees and the Pharisees, the Essenes lived outside of Jerusalem
in rural communes. Like the Hutterites and Shakers, they owned property communally
(Newman 2006, p. 86). Also like the Shakers, they practiced celibacy and maintained the
community by adopting other people’s children (Newman 2006, p. 87). Philo explains
Essene celibacy as follows:
“Furthermore, they eschew marriage because they clearly discern it to be the sole or the
principal danger to the maintenance of communal life... For he who is either fast bound in
the love lures of his wife or under the stress of nature makes his children his first care ceases
to be the same to others.” (Newman 2006, p. 166)
Thus the Pharisees and Sadducees appear to be right-wing religious groups in my clas-
sification, while the Essenes are a left-wing religious group.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper I have constructed a model of religion as an institution that provides community
enforcement of contracts within families. I have then provided evidence that this mechanism
helps to explain the organization of Amish religious communities. By way of conclusion, I
reiterate the main generalizable results from the paper, and discuss some policy implications:
1. Religious groups differ in the values that they emphasize. Right-wing religious groups
feature relatively less redistribution and have rules that strengthen family ties. These
groups attract richer members. Left-wing religious groups feature relatively more
redistribution and have rules that are neutral towards the family or that may even
weaken family ties. These groups attract poorer members. The differences between
these groups are due to the different incentive problems faced by their members and
not to differences in fundamental preferences. Right-wing groups are described by
my model while left-wing groups are described by the club goods model of Iannacone
(1992).
2. Religious groups described by my model are inefficient, in the sense that it would
be possible for parents and children to achieve a Pareto superior outcome if parents
could commit to bequest schedules conditional on their children’s actions. The source
of the inefficiency is that not only punishment but also monitoring of children must be
delegated from the parents to the community, but the community has less information
than parents about children’s actions. Seemingly inefficient cultural behaviors really
are inefficient in my theory, in contrast to the theories of Boyd and Richerson (1985)
and Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) in which seemingly inefficient cultural behaviors
are in fact efficient given people’s preferences and cognitive abilities.
3. Despite the inefficiency of religious groups described by my model, these groups can
persist over many generations. Neither language barriers, as in Lazear (1999) and
Michalopoulos (2012), nor parental preferences, as in Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001)
are sufficient by themselves to maintain cultural distinctiveness in the face of material
incentives for assimilation into the larger society. However a coalition of parents who
collectively agree to punish children who assimilate can successfully maintain cultural
distinctiveness over long periods of time.
4. Since minority cultural persistence is driven by parents’ desire to get care from their
children, and not by technological barriers to assimilation or by intrinsic preferences
for engaging in distinctively minority behaviors, changes in public policy may affect
whether minority cultures persist. In particular policies that provide old age support,
or that otherwise substitute for services normally provided by the family, may increase
the rate of cultural assimilation. However, it is not clear whether such policies are
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desirable from a welfare perspective. The value of family togetherness and the value of
economic efficiency are not fully commensurable, and decisions between these values
cannot be made exclusively on the basis of revealed preference analysis. Thinking
about how to trade off these values would be an interesting project for research in
both economics and philosophy.
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Figure 1: This figure shows budget sets and utility-maximizing indifference curves for a
child with wage w and w′, where w′ < w. The child always gets greater utility from the
higher wage.
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Figure 2: Wealth distribution of parents in sample
35
Figure 3: Probability of leaving church by affiliation for all children in sample
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Table 1: North American Amish population estimates
Year Estimated population
1901 6,300
1911 6,600
1921 9,960
1931 14,300
1941 21,100
1951 27,675
1961 36,855
1971 50,280
1981 77,955
1991 123,025
2001 189,335
2012 273,710
Source: Kraybill, Johnson-Weiner and Nolt (2013), p. 156
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
All matched observations Observations with building value>0
Outcome variables
Child leaves church 0.146 0.147
(0.353) (0.354)
Child migrates 0.0656 0.0626
(0.248) (0.242)
Child-level variables
Child’s age 11.79 11.90
(2.579) (2.580)
Child is male 0.511 0.508
(0.500) (0.500)
Household-level variables
Father is farmer 0.513 0.493
(0.500) (0.500)
Father’s age 41.10 41.62
(6.390) (6.416)
Mother’s age 40.07 40.57
(6.337) (6.330)
Number of siblings 7.836 7.835
(3.109) (3.150)
Building value 59,803 72,657
(41,112) (33,467)
Observations 3,611 2,972
Standard errors in parentheses. Dollar values are 1988 dollars.
38
T
ab
le
3:
E
ff
ec
t
of
p
ar
en
ts
’
w
ea
lt
h
on
ch
il
d
re
n
’s
d
ec
is
io
n
to
le
av
e
th
e
A
m
is
h
ch
u
rc
h
M
ea
n
of
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
0
.1
4
7
0
.1
4
7
0
.1
4
7
0
.1
4
5
0
.1
4
6
lo
g(
P
ar
en
t’
s
w
ea
lt
h
)
-0
.0
5
1
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
4
5
8
*
*
-0
.0
4
5
8
*
*
(0
.0
1
7
4
)
(0
.0
1
8
3
)
(0
.0
1
7
8
)
lo
g(
P
ar
en
t’
s
w
ea
lt
h
)
(a
lt
er
n
at
e
m
ea
su
re
)
-0
.0
6
2
6
*
*
(0
.0
2
7
8
)
P
ar
en
ts
ow
n
n
o
p
ro
p
er
ty
0
.0
1
9
3
(0
.0
2
1
4
)
C
h
il
d
is
m
al
e
0
.0
5
7
3
*
*
*
0
.0
5
7
3
*
*
*
0
.0
5
4
4
*
*
*
0
.0
5
4
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
4
7
)
(0
.0
1
4
7
)
(0
.0
1
5
1
)
(0
.0
1
3
5
)
C
h
il
d
’s
ag
e
0
.0
0
1
4
5
0
.0
0
0
8
4
7
0
.0
0
1
8
9
0
.0
0
3
0
4
(0
.0
0
2
5
5
)
(0
.0
0
2
5
0
)
(0
.0
0
3
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
2
4
)
F
at
h
er
is
fa
rm
er
-0
.0
7
7
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
6
8
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
5
6
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
9
1
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
8
8
)
(0
.0
2
0
3
)
(0
.0
3
1
0
)
(0
.0
1
7
4
)
F
at
h
er
’s
ag
e
0
.0
1
0
6
*
*
*
0
.0
1
1
6
*
*
*
0
.0
1
4
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
8
2
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
3
4
8
)
(0
.0
0
3
3
8
)
(0
.0
0
3
9
8
)
(0
.0
0
3
0
5
)
M
ot
h
er
’s
ag
e
-0
.0
0
6
5
3
*
-0
.0
0
6
9
2
*
*
-0
.0
1
0
4
*
*
-0
.0
0
5
8
1
*
*
(0
.0
0
3
3
1
)
(0
.0
0
3
2
7
)
(0
.0
0
3
9
8
)
(0
.0
0
2
9
7
)
C
om
p
le
te
d
n
u
m
b
er
of
si
b
li
n
gs
-0
.0
0
6
9
8
*
*
(0
.0
0
2
7
1
)
A
ffi
li
at
io
n
F
E
?
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
2
9
7
2
2
9
7
2
2
9
7
2
2
1
2
0
3
6
1
1
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
=
1
if
th
e
ch
il
d
h
as
le
ft
th
e
A
m
is
h
ch
u
rc
h
b
y
2
0
1
0
.
W
ea
lt
h
is
th
e
va
lu
e
o
f
b
u
il
d
in
g
s
ow
n
ed
b
y
th
e
ch
il
d
’s
p
a
re
n
ts
in
19
88
.
W
ea
lt
h
(a
lt
er
n
at
e
m
ea
su
re
)
is
th
e
va
lu
e
o
f
b
u
il
d
in
g
s
a
n
d
la
n
d
ow
n
ed
b
y
th
e
ch
il
d
’s
p
a
re
n
ts
in
1
9
8
8
.
N
o
p
ro
p
er
ty
=
1
if
th
e
ch
il
d
’s
p
ar
en
ts
ow
n
ed
n
o
b
u
il
d
in
gs
in
19
88
.
C
ol
u
m
n
s
1
,
2
,
3
,
a
n
d
4
d
ro
p
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
o
f
ch
il
d
re
n
w
h
o
se
p
a
re
n
ts
ow
n
n
o
b
u
il
d
in
g
s
in
19
88
.
C
ol
u
m
n
4
d
ro
p
s
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
s
fr
om
W
ay
n
e
a
n
d
T
u
sc
a
ra
w
a
s
co
u
n
ti
es
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
b
y
d
is
tr
ic
t
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
*
*
*
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t
at
1%
,
**
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t
at
5%
,
*
si
gn
ic
a
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
.
39
T
ab
le
4:
H
et
er
og
en
eo
u
s
eff
ec
ts
of
p
ar
en
ts
’
w
ea
lt
h
o
n
ch
il
d
re
n
’s
d
ec
is
io
n
to
le
av
e
th
e
A
m
is
h
ch
u
rc
h
S
am
p
le
B
oy
s
G
ir
ls
F
a
th
er
is
fa
rm
er
F
a
th
er
is
n
o
n
-f
a
rm
er
M
ea
n
of
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
0.
17
5
0
.1
1
9
0
.1
0
3
0
.1
9
0
lo
g(
P
ar
en
t’
s
w
ea
lt
h
)
-0
.0
58
4*
*
-0
.0
3
1
3
-0
.0
6
5
7
*
*
-0
.0
2
6
1
(0
.0
24
9
)
(0
.0
2
0
1
)
(0
.0
2
6
7
)
(0
.0
2
8
4
)
C
h
il
d
is
m
al
e
0
.0
3
8
1
*
0
.0
7
5
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
0
0
)
(0
.0
2
0
1
)
C
h
il
d
’s
ag
e
0.
00
50
7
-0
.0
0
2
9
1
0
.0
0
1
3
3
0
.0
0
1
0
8
(0
.0
03
84
)
(0
.0
0
3
7
6
)
(0
.0
0
3
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
4
1
5
)
F
at
h
er
is
fa
rm
er
-0
.0
94
2*
**
-0
.0
6
0
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
27
7)
(0
.0
1
8
3
)
F
at
h
er
’s
ag
e
0.
00
49
6
0.
0
1
6
6
*
*
*
0
.0
0
6
3
4
0
.0
1
5
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
04
59
)
(0
.0
0
4
1
8
)
(0
.0
0
4
7
3
)
(0
.0
0
5
1
3
)
M
ot
h
er
’s
ag
e
-0
.0
01
14
-0
.0
1
2
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
5
7
-0
.0
1
1
1
*
*
(0
.0
04
53
)
(0
.0
0
4
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
9
5
)
(0
.0
0
4
8
5
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
1,
51
1
1
,4
6
1
1
,4
6
6
1
,5
0
6
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
=
1
if
th
e
ch
il
d
h
as
le
ft
th
e
A
m
is
h
ch
u
rc
h
b
y
2
0
1
0
.
W
ea
lt
h
is
th
e
va
lu
e
o
f
b
u
il
d
in
g
s
ow
n
ed
b
y
th
e
ch
il
d
’s
p
a
re
n
ts
in
19
88
.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
d
ro
p
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
s
fo
r
w
h
ic
h
p
a
re
n
ts
ow
n
n
o
b
u
il
d
in
g
s.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
b
y
d
is
tr
ic
t
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
**
*
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t
at
1%
,
**
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t
at
5%
,
*
si
gn
ic
a
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
.
40
T
ab
le
5:
E
x
it
ra
te
s
b
y
affi
li
at
io
n
w
it
h
co
n
tr
ol
s
in
fu
ll
sa
m
p
le
an
d
va
ri
ou
s
su
b
sa
m
p
le
s
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
=
1
if
ch
il
d
le
av
es
ch
u
rc
h
b
y
2
0
1
0
S
am
p
le
C
o
effi
ci
en
t
on
N
ew
O
rd
er
C
o
effi
ci
en
t
o
n
O
ld
O
rd
er
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
F
u
ll
sa
m
p
le
0.
28
6
0
.0
7
7
7
3
6
1
1
(0
.0
37
1
)
(0
.0
1
6
2
)
B
oy
s
0.
31
0
0
.0
9
5
1
1
8
4
5
(0
.0
51
8
)
(0
.0
2
1
3
)
G
ir
ls
0.
25
7
0
.0
5
8
9
1
7
6
6
(0
.0
43
0
)
(0
.0
1
9
4
)
F
at
h
er
is
fa
rm
er
0.
25
5
0
.0
5
1
6
1
8
5
4
(0
.0
49
2
)
(0
.0
1
7
8
)
F
at
h
er
is
n
on
-f
ar
m
er
0.
33
5
0
.1
1
4
1
7
5
7
(0
.0
56
9
)
(0
.0
3
3
7
)
P
ar
en
ts
’
w
ea
lt
h
ab
ov
e
m
ed
ia
n
0.
25
2
0
.0
8
3
3
1
4
8
8
(0
.0
46
3
)
(0
.0
1
9
4
)
P
ar
en
ts
’
w
ea
lt
h
b
el
ow
m
ed
ia
n
0.
37
6
0
.1
1
1
1
4
8
4
(0
.0
56
4
)
(0
.0
2
7
7
)
P
ar
en
ts
ow
n
n
o
p
ro
p
er
ty
0.
20
7
0
.0
0
3
6
3
9
(0
.1
06
)
(0
.0
5
2
)
E
ac
h
li
n
e
re
p
or
ts
co
effi
ci
en
ts
on
affi
li
at
io
n
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
fo
r
a
re
g
re
ss
io
n
o
f
a
n
in
d
ic
a
to
r
fo
r
w
h
et
h
er
th
e
ch
il
d
le
av
es
th
e
ch
u
rc
h
o
n
affi
li
at
io
n
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
p
lu
s
co
n
tr
ol
s.
C
on
tr
ol
s
in
cl
u
d
e
th
e
lo
g
a
ri
th
m
o
f
th
e
va
lu
e
o
f
b
u
il
d
in
g
s
ow
n
ed
b
y
th
e
ch
il
d
’s
p
a
re
n
ts
,
a
n
in
d
ic
a
to
r
fo
r
w
h
et
h
er
th
e
ch
il
d
’s
p
ar
en
ts
ow
n
n
o
b
u
il
d
in
gs
,
a
n
in
d
ic
a
to
r
fo
r
w
h
et
h
er
th
e
ch
il
d
’s
fa
th
er
is
a
fa
rm
er
,
th
e
ch
il
d
’s
a
g
e
a
n
d
g
en
d
er
,
a
n
d
th
e
ag
es
of
th
e
ch
il
d
’s
m
ot
h
er
an
d
fa
th
er
.
T
h
e
o
m
it
te
d
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
t
is
fo
r
th
e
A
n
d
y
W
ea
ve
r
a
ffi
li
a
ti
o
n
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
ar
e
cl
u
st
er
ed
b
y
d
is
tr
ic
t.
41
T
ab
le
6:
E
ff
ec
t
of
p
ar
en
ts
’
w
ea
lt
h
on
ch
il
d
re
n
’s
d
ec
is
io
n
to
m
ig
ra
te
M
ea
n
of
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
0.
0
6
3
.0
6
3
0
.0
6
3
0
.0
5
5
lo
g(
P
ar
en
ts
’
w
ea
lt
h
)
0.
0
0
3
0
3
0
.0
0
5
2
2
0
.0
0
5
2
0
(0
.0
0
9
8
9
)
(0
.0
1
0
3
)
(0
.0
1
0
4
)
lo
g(
P
ar
en
ts
’
w
ea
lt
h
)(
al
te
rn
at
e
m
ea
su
re
)
0
.0
0
2
8
6
(0
.0
1
3
8
)
C
h
il
d
is
m
al
e
0
.0
1
7
3
*
0
.0
1
7
2
*
0
.0
0
6
2
3
(0
.0
0
8
8
4
)
(0
.0
0
8
8
4
)
(0
.0
1
0
4
)
C
h
il
d
’s
ag
e
-0
.0
0
0
5
3
7
-0
.0
0
0
2
0
9
-0
.0
0
0
8
2
6
(0
.0
0
2
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
2
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
2
2
0
)
F
at
h
er
is
fa
rm
er
-0
.0
2
3
5
*
*
-0
.0
2
8
7
*
*
-0
.0
1
5
8
(0
.0
1
0
4
)
(0
.0
1
1
0
)
(0
.0
1
5
4
)
F
at
h
er
’s
ag
e
0
.0
0
0
2
8
9
-0
.0
0
0
2
6
3
0
.0
0
2
5
8
(0
.0
0
2
4
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
4
5
)
(0
.0
0
2
7
2
)
M
ot
h
er
’s
ag
e
0
.0
0
1
0
2
0
.0
0
1
2
4
-0
.0
0
2
0
2
(0
.0
0
2
3
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
3
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
5
8
)
C
om
p
le
te
d
n
u
m
b
er
of
si
b
li
n
gs
0
.0
0
3
7
7
*
(0
.0
0
2
1
8
)
A
ffi
li
at
io
n
F
E
?
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
2,
9
7
2
2
,9
7
2
2
,9
7
2
2
,1
2
0
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
=
1
if
th
e
ch
il
d
h
as
m
ig
ra
te
d
b
y
2
0
1
0
.
W
ea
lt
h
is
th
e
va
lu
e
o
f
b
u
il
d
in
g
s
ow
n
ed
b
y
th
e
ch
il
d
’s
p
a
re
n
ts
in
1
9
8
8
.
W
ea
lt
h
(a
lt
er
n
at
e
m
ea
su
re
)
is
th
e
va
lu
e
of
b
u
il
d
in
g
s
a
n
d
la
n
d
ow
n
ed
b
y
th
e
ch
il
d
’s
p
a
re
n
ts
in
1
9
8
8
.
C
o
lu
m
n
s
1
,
2
,
3
,
a
n
d
4
d
ro
p
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
s
of
ch
il
d
re
n
w
h
os
e
p
ar
en
ts
ow
n
n
o
b
u
il
d
in
g
s
in
1
9
8
8
.
C
o
lu
m
n
4
d
ro
p
s
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
fr
o
m
W
ay
n
e
a
n
d
T
u
sc
a
ra
w
a
s
co
u
n
ti
es
.
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
b
y
d
is
tr
ic
t
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
*
*
*
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
%
,
*
*
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
5
%
,
*
si
g
n
ic
a
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
.
42
Table 7: Comparing Amish and Hutterite Institutions
Amish Hutterites
(Private property) (Communal property)
Restricts consumption choices Yes Yes
Restricts productive technologies Yes No
Restricts education Yes No
Restricts family contact No Yes
Family ties Strong Weak
This table summarizes the differences between Amish and Hutterite rules and family ties.
See text for details.
Table 8: Distribution of wealth of Quakers and non-Quakers in colonial Philadelphia
Assessed wealth in 1754 (£) Total Population Quakers
10-19 50 34
20-29 15 15
30-39 21 22
40-49 7 7
50-59 3 4
60-79 3 5
80-99 2 6
100- 4 6
Assessed wealth in 1774 (£) Total Population Quakers
0 53 26
1-9 17 17
10-19 9 8
20-29 5 6
30-39 4 6
40-49 2 2
50-59 2 6
60-79 3 6
80-99 2 6
100-149 3 5
150-199 1 2
200- 3 8
This table shows the distribution of assessed wealth for the total population of Philadelphia
and for Quakers, derived from the Philadelphia tax list. Each entry is a percentage of the
relevant population. Source: Frost (1973), p. 205
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